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factors that go toward making the best kind of a business man be so combined that wherever merchants are found, the old motto may be justified which, in the days of the greatest splendor of Venetian commerce, was carved on the façade of the church of San Giacomo di Rialta:

Hoc circa Templum situs mercantibus æquum
Pondera nec vergant nec sit conventio prava.

GUSTAV BUNZEL.

GRATZ, AUSTRIA.

MUSIC AND RELIGION : A PSYCHOLOGICAL RIVALRY.

The recent movement in the Catholic Church, initiated by the attitude of the late Pope, and made definite by the present one, which has for its object a widespread and radical reform of church music, forces this part of the service into a prominent place in the attention of the psychological analyst. Is this movement merely an attempt on the part of the church to combat a dangerous modern tendency by entrenching itself more thoroughly in that mediævalism where its most precious traditions lie? Or is there a real reason in the nature of religion that forces to an issue the question of Gregorian chant versus modern mass? To put the question in another way, is there a field of distinctively religious music, and what differentiates this field from that of music in general?

The popular mind has a certain comprehension of the situation but it is based upon little real understanding of the conditions. The large majority of people will readily admit that they attend church primarily for the purpose of hearing music, and that without this feature the service would offer little attraction. The church, for its part, recognizes the situation in the popular mind, and always desirous of securing churchgoers, makes the attempt, as to the legitimacy of which it must be its own best judge, to give the public what is wanted. Witness the extensive provisions made in all churches in the way of musical committees and trained

choirs, the large proportion of the ordinary service given over to music, and the immense number of purely musical programs of the vespers order, which differ from ordinary dignified musical entertainments only in the fact that they are given in churches, and that the words deal with religious themes. The public readily sees that this is highly entertaining, and, to a certain extent edifying, but not altogether religious. Very few, however, seem inclined to question the matter, and to find the difference between the religious and artistic elements involved. And this vagueness is not difficult to understand, when we see that the most searching analysis finds itself confronted with serious difficulties, and that final conclusions are to a large extent determined by points of departure.

When the search for differentia of religious music is fairly opened, one judgment that will readily occur to us is that of Huysmans in his "En Route." Durtal in his tiresome spiritual wanderings and battles with the flesh, occasionally refreshes the desert with the deliverances of an informed taste on the subjects of church music and church architecture. There is a certain incongruity in the fact that while the artistic and religious elements in his own nature seem hopelessly confused, he is still able to point out clearly some differences in the religious character of mediæval and modern music. In hearing the modern mass, he tells us, the chief impression which the listener gets, and which is definitely antagonistic to the religious feeling, is that of the individual artist showing himself throughout his handiwork. This would mean, of course, that one of the chief elements in the artistic production, namely character, must of necessity be lacking in true religious music. On the other hand, according to Huysmans, the Gregorian chant bears with it in an essential way the mode of its origin, being the spontaneous expression of the pure religion of the monasteries, a growth, and not referable to any particular author. While these expressions might imply a rather strict limitation of the term religion, yet, on the basis of the personal, mystical attitude, Huysmans gives a corroboration of popular opinion

in finding a barrier in the individuality and concrete self-sufficiency of the work of art.

If we grant the conclusion of the general consciousness that there is a real difference between the attitudes which characterize music and religion, it becomes highly necessary to account for the constant confusion and intermixture in practice. We may say in general that this results from their exceedingly close kinship, as both find their psychological origin in that part of human nature which we denominate the mystical. No distinct meaning of the term mysticism has ever been formulated, and attempts usually end in all the vagueness which the word implies. At the same time, the method of its application in current usage is tolerably clear. It is certain that we cannot refer to mysticism in the sense of a simple germinal impulse, but rather as a general term which covers a whole group of attitudes, supposed to be marked off, rather indefinitely, from the so-called discursive or rational. This means that the predominating element is feeling rather than thought, if we care to follow the general method of defining a thing by making it a composition of abstractions. Psychology is not yet free from the traditional method of dividing human nature into compartments. We may say that mysticism is a matter of the emotions, but this does not tell the whole truth unless we extend the meaning of the latter term. This is not the place to criticise the current theories of the emotions, but merely to refer to the fact that they are generally unsatisfactory when carried beyond the field of psychological theorizing and made to do service as explanatory principles. The difficulty is largely a matter of the division we have referred to, a neglect of the question how the emotions have come to be. There are, to be sure, approximately pure states of feeling and thinking, but these are extreme conditions rather than separate mental elements. Again, we certainly lose the significance of the emotions, if we fail to take into account their evolutionary history. When approached in this way, what are the emotions? They may be spoken of generally as those primal elements in human nature which represent the broadest adap-

tations in organic development, and mark out the environment into situations, to which human life, as all life, is a series of reactions. There may be under certain conditions an abstract, dry, impersonal contemplation of the world, but only a moment's consideration is necessary to show us what a small part is played in real life by abstract intellectual processes, and how much of our experience has that personal flavor, that estimate of value, which is the mark of an emotional attitude. There is a sense in which prejudice is more to be trusted than clear thinking, in spite of our logics. Even in science, once in a long while, insight plays a part as well as scales and weighing pans. Feeling is not so much the enemy of the best though as its motive power, and, if we dare to say it, its guide. What, then, is mysticism? It is the intuitive judgment in which no attempt is made to clarify the terms. It is not a pure feeling state, but a feeling attitude, or feeling comprehension. So far our account covers what takes place in normal everyday experience. There is one step further, namely that in which the state of mind becomes a source of satisfaction and therefore an object of realization in itself. This need or inclination is probably the common source of both artistic and religious mysticism.

When we look for the special kind of mysticism that dwells in the world of art, we are liable to be confounded by the supposition prevalent among laymen that artistic production and appreciation lie apart from the general order of things, and require, like religion, an initiation into the mysteries, before they can be understood. This belief unfortunately detracts from the value of art by making it a mere side issue, the indulgence of a generally worthless class of people called connoisseurs. As a matter of fact, close study of the subject fails to reveal any comprehension different in kind from that of ordinary life. The artistic "schein" deserves to be so called only by reason of the fact that its situations are not sufficiently commonplace to be found in real life, but, like Plato's ideas, none the less present the meaning of life in terms of these situations. This discussion is, of course, trite now-a-days, but is presented for the purpose of

showing that the ideal situations created by the imagination call out the same mystical reactions as those of ordinary life, and involve, though to be sure in cathartic quantities, the same emotions. Very few would be inclined to deny our conclusions so far, but when we come to the special application necessary for our purpose, progress may not be so easy. Strangely enough, the views of theorists concerning music stand at the extremes of opposition, and seem disinclined to take any middle ground. There are the old estimates of Hegel and Schopenhauer which place music at the highest point in the hierarchy of arts because the medium calls least attention to itself, and consequently gives the least obstructed contemplation of the absolute. These terms remind one of religious mysticism. Then come the views of the formalists who insist upon the entirely contentless character of music, and make its finest appreciation an intellectual exercise in harmony and counterpoint. Then comes an important movement in music itself, which tends to prove that it can be representative, and with it the opinions of the expressionists who also seem afflicted with a mania for extremes. There appears to be a prospect of settlement along one line, and as this falls within his field, the psychologist may presume to offer one or two considerations. It is possible that there is no work of art which can be called representative in the sense of being imitative, and that the only expression is that of the emotional attitude common to the situation presented by the work of art and that in life which it is supposed to represent. What is the difference between the prelude to the "Creation" and "A Morning in the Barnyard?" Clearly one of emotional values. On the other hand, it is by no means certain that the contemplation of formal features is on the same emotional plane as a mathematical computation. There is much to show that the simplest combinations of tones, and even separate tones have a distinct emotional significance. As to the element of rhythm both in music and the dance, a number of important studies tend to prove that its close connection with the emotions lies at the basis of all art development. At what point, then, have we

arrived? The old estimate of music seems correct if we translate the contemplation of the absolute into terms of the psychology of satisfaction. It is that form of art in which the conditions are so arranged as to place the emotional attitude at its best, with a minimum of the thinking process. It is then the most mystical of all the arts because its limitations are the least.

In religious mysticism we find to a large extent a parallel of the conditions we have been studying. Whatever the general system may be, the essence of religion is taken to be a matter of personal experience, of emotional attitude. The importance of this aspect is clearly indicated by Professor James in his recent study. He first gives a general account of the phenomena of mysticism, especially that produced by anæsthesia, and then shows that religious mysticism is of the same kind. The chief difficulty is that Professor James seems to take religious mysticism in a limited though, to be sure, the highest sense, that of the feeling of complete absorption into the absolute. Why the feeling of nothingness in the presence of nothingness should be the final aim of religious contemplation is a problem psychology is not yet ready to solve, but it is possibly an extension of the same attitude which is produced by contemplation of the vast and seemingly unlimited. The same reaction in many of its features can be obtained experimentally by the layman in an attempt to comprehend infinite empty space. But most of the examples, at least in Christianity, show the high state of religious fervor attended by a vivid concrete realization, as of the presence of some saint, the Holy Mother, or Christ. There can be little doubt that such hallucinatory experiences lie at the basis of all that is included under the term revelation. It must be admitted then that religion falls psychologically largely within the field of ideal contemplation, or, in other words, of the imagination. So far we have nothing to differentiate the religious from the artistic feeling. The relation is so close and they involve so many common elements that Professor Santayana is able to bring forward all but conclusive evidence to support the thesis of his "Inter-

pretations" that religion and poetry are identical. The argument is true as far as it goes, but it fails to give a complete account of the religious consciousness. The appreciation of poetry never involves one in the difficulties incident to religious conviction. Belief in the existence of Hamlet is entirely different from belief in the existence of Christ in the mind of the religious man. The first is ideal, the second ideal *and* actual. The future world of Virgil, Dante or Milton never raises a doubt, but the future world of the Christian is always seeking to establish itself by vulgar evidence. The difference then, as we see it, is that while the religious consciousness involves the same mystical attitude, and the same creation of ideal situations, as we find in the artistic consciousness, it goes a step further and requires assent to some body of doctrine. The poet is always conscious that his vision lies within the limits of his imagination, the religious man is never so. The artistic conception is quite of the earth, earthy; the religious conception is of the supernatural. We might raise the question how emotional attitudes can be called out by situations which are supposed by their very nature to negate the set of conditions under which these attitudes have grown up. Careful attention to the facts, however, will show that the goods and ills of the spiritual life are largely the same as those provided by nature, and that the negation is chiefly a matter of the screen upon which they are projected.

Besides trusts and rapid transit, the nineteenth century is notable for achievements in two great directions, science and music. It may not occur to us, perhaps on account of our lack of perspective, that this is a paradox of the most pronounced kind. It presents a double ideal, of extreme rationalism in the case of its thinking, of extreme mysticism in the case of its art. And stranger still the two can easily exist without conflict in the same individual. With the devotion to clear and distinct thinking so characteristic of our day, it is natural that there should be the sense of a large gap in the environmental contacts which human nature normally requires, a sense of atrophied emotions, and lessened real life. The deification of science leaves a feeling of the neglect

which the shrines of other divinities must suffer. Abstract impersonal thinking is seen to be but half the story and creates the desire for a more intense personal life. This seems to be the reason for the paradox and the extreme form which it takes in our day. The same fact is illustrated in the permanent characteristics of certain peoples. The British mind, for example, has been notoriously averse to any kind of problem which cannot be stated in the clearest common sense terms. And yet it is a nation of great poets.

Our rationalism and our dissatisfaction with it furnish the prime condition for a revival in religion, as the past well shows, and the question arises why history does not repeat itself in our day. One can hardly fail to be impressed by the close parallelism between the conditions at present and those which prevailed in the Roman world at the time of the pagan reaction. There is the same appeal to reason as the arbiter of all problems, and to a large extent the same appeal to cut-and-dried systems of ethics for motives of conduct. In other words, there is the same surrender of life to thought, and what is of most importance for our purpose, the same feeling that this surrender ultimately entails not freedom but galling bonds. There was a revulsion of human nature, and its consequences every one knows. The finest, most consistent theories were discarded, and adherence given to all kinds of mystical oriental cults. Christianity prevailed over Greek philosophy, martyrdom prevailed over stoicism, nature prevailed over logic. Other examples of this dialectic of human nature are the succession of Methodism to Deism in England, and of Pietism to the Illumination in Germany. There is a fine irony in the fact which Brandes points out that many of the most important Romanticists who began their careers as exponents of illumination principles, found their ultimate end in the Catholic Church.

Why is there little probability of a religious revival at present? We are in a position to answer the question at least partially, if we put together some of the results of our analysis. We have seen that there are two chief factors in the religious consciousness, the personal, mystical attitude

coupled with the element of belief. In spite of the fact that so many believe that faith must be supported by doctrine, the history of religion shows exactly the opposite. Just as artistic feeling inspires the imagination to create appropriate situations in the various forms of art, so the religious feeling is the one necessary motive in the creation of religious systems. Given a sufficiently strong faith, intellectual difficulties fall into the background, and assent to doctrine comes as a matter of course. Logical proof of the existence of God is for the intensely religious nature a needless procedure. If, however, the religious feeling fails to reach the proper degree of intensity, a body of doctrine must justify itself as a philosophy. This is just the difficulty at present. Rationalistic investigation makes belief at the best a difficult matter, and the necessary element of faith is lacking. Why? Because music, the great modern art, can satisfy the mystical need, and indulge the cosmic emotion without asking assent to anything or putting the slightest strain upon purely thinking processes.

The reaction against rationalism is now on. All kinds of small mystical "isms" arise, make for a time absurd exhibitions of themselves, and then die out. Even the more respectable ones like Christian Science, Spiritualism and Theosophy are not remarkable for the educated intelligence of their adherents. The scientifically trained mind which is unable to play its mystical inclinations out in any kind of crude occultism, is willing enough to be religious, but its faith is not sufficiently strong to overcome the difficulties, so it follows the line of least resistance and listens to music, and this still more dulls the edge of faith. It might be answered that music, like the rest of the service, is a kind of "yoga," or preparation for the religious attitude. But it must be admitted that the true preparation provides a series of means which do not satisfy in themselves but create a larger demand. In so far as any part of the service is a work of art, it fails of its purpose. Our conclusion then is that the movement referred to at the beginning is based upon sound principles, but has probably undertaken a hopeless task.

Music and religion are rivals for the same claim in human nature, and so long as music occupies its present place in the general consciousness, we can look for no widespread revival in religion.

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THE SCOTTISH CHURCH CASE AND ITS ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

The first day of August, 1904, is a day which will never be forgotten in the history of religion in the British Islands. On that day the highest legal tribunal of the nation, after searching investigation, arrived at a decision which has had practical results that are serious indeed, while its moral consequences are immeasurably great. By that decision, eleven hundred churches in Scotland were at one stroke dispossessed of the whole of their property, valued at more than two millions sterling. Their congregations were left without meeting-houses, their ministers without manse, their students without colleges, and they were deprived of the whole of their invested funds. And all these things have been found legally to belong to a very small body of churches in the outlying districts of the north and west of Scotland—a body so small that it could not possibly make use of more than a fraction of the property now declared by law to belong to it. Extraordinary as this may be, it is, I repeat, the moral consequences of this declaration which are so great as to merit the attention of every intelligent man.

In dwelling on the circumstances which have brought about such a state of things, I speak from personal knowledge of the ecclesiastical situation in Scotland, and also with constant reference to the official report of the statements on both sides as presented before the law courts in Edinburgh and London.¹ My object is, to discuss the essential principle involved in this famous case, and not to dwell on its merely ephemeral aspects.

¹ "The Free Church of Scotland Appeals, 1903-4." Authorized Report. Edinburgh: Macniven and Wallace; London: Hodder and Stoughton.